Multiplayer Bargaining with Delayed Agreement
نویسنده
چکیده
The best known equilibrium strategies of multiplayer bargaining define that the agreement is established at the first moment. In this paper two new subgame perfect Nash equilibria strategies are proposed, one in which the agreement moment is delayed for T > 1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78.
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