Sequential Bidding in Day-Ahead Auctions for Spot Energy and Power Systems Reserve

In this paper a novel approach for sequential bidding on day-ahead auction markets for spot energy and power systems reserve is presented. For the spot market a relatively simple method is considered as a competitive market is assumed. For the reserve market one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the competitors is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price. This results in a method for sequential bidding, where the bidding prices and capacities on the spot and reserve markets are calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. With an exemplary application is shown that the trading sequence leads to increasing bidding capacities and prices in the reverse rank number of the markets. Hence, the consideration of a defined trading sequence greatly influences the mathematical representation of the optimal bidding behavior under price uncertainty in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and power systems reserve.