Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof
نویسندگان
چکیده
Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS property.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 32 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004