Fishy Behavior : Evaluating Preferences for Honesty in the Marketplace
نویسنده
چکیده
The role of the market in shaping various forms of behavior is perhaps the fundamental issue facing behavioral economics today. This study conducts a field experiment in fish markets of Kolkata, India that are prone to widespread cheating by sellers and examines whether, and to what extent, intrinsic preferences for honesty influence outcomes in actual market transactions. Exploiting systematic exogenous variations in fish prices, an indicator of marginal economic benefit from cheating, the experiment uncovers an inverted U-shaped relationship between the fish price and the amount cheated. The results suggest that tastes for honesty can mitigate fraud in natural markets.
منابع مشابه
A multi-criteria decision making approach for priority areas selection in membrane industry for investment promotion: a case study in Iran Marketplace
Membrane technologies for the separation of mixtures have gained an extensive worldwide attraction in the modern industrialized world. They have many industrial and medical applications such as water desalination, wastewater reclamation, gas separation, food and medical applications. However, even though all these applications have their own efficiency and market, the selection of priority appl...
متن کاملThe Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance
We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved be...
متن کاملSimple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also ...
متن کاملDynamic Credibility Threshold Assignment in Trust and Reputation Mechanisms Using PID Controller
In online shopping buyers do not have enough information about sellers and cannot inspect the products before purchasing them. To help buyers find reliable sellers, online marketplaces deploy Trust and Reputation Management (TRM) systems. These systems aggregate buyers feedback about the sellers they have interacted with and about the products they have purchased, to inform users within the mar...
متن کاملA Sociological Explanation of Social Honesty Effect on Political Participation (Case of Study: Residents in Gorgan in 2016)
This study was made to provide sociological explanation about social honesty effect on political participation. Since our community has undergone many changes during the time and considering that it has been changing from traditional society to a modern community, there is necessary need to have enough knowledge and recognition in context of quantity and quality of political participation more ...
متن کامل