When do simple policies win?

نویسندگان

  • Gilat Levy
  • Ronny Razin
چکیده

We present a simple model of a debate between two interested parties which takes into account the complexity of their policy positions. The two debaters engage in all-pay-auctions to win slots of time/attention to present their positions to a decision maker. Complexity of a policy is modelled through the number of slots of attention needed to get the policy across. We show that when the number of attention slots is scarce, but still large enough to allow for both sides to fully present all their policies, simple policies have an advantage over more complex ones. We show that this advantage of simple policies is diminished only when the number of attention slots is fairly large and when the decision maker is strongly persuaded by more complex policies.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Rebate, returns and price protection policies in channel coordination

We study channel coordination policies for products subject to midlife price declines during their short product life cycles. Using a two-period supply chain model consisting of one supplier and one retailer, we identify policies and/or conditions under which the supply chain can be coordinated and a win-win situation can be guaranteed. We also provide algorithms to determine the win-win policy...

متن کامل

Information search in decisions from experience. Do our patterns of sampling foreshadow our decisions?

Do different patterns of sampling influence the decisions people make, even when the information the decisions are based on is equivalent? Do more and less switching between options correlate with different kinds of decision policies? In past research, the correspondence between search and decision patterns has been difficult to ascertain because the information obtained has often been confound...

متن کامل

Hong Kong.

We develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition. When policy payoffs are state-dependent, party policies do not converge to the median voter’s ideal policy if the media report only party policies. News analysis about the state, though possibly biased, can discipline off-equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies. Since vote...

متن کامل

Title Media as Watchdogs: the Role of News Media in Electoral Competition Media as Watchdogs: the Role of News Media in Electoral Competition *

We develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition. When policy payoffs are state-dependent, party policies do not converge to the median voter’s ideal policy if the media report only party policies. News analysis about the state, though possibly biased, can discipline off-equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies. Since vote...

متن کامل

Electoral Margins and American Foreign Policy1

Conventional wisdom holds that large margins of electoral victory contribute to presidential power. How does this variation in power impact U.S. foreign policy? I argue here that presidents who win elections by a substantial margin authorize the use of substantial military force more regularly, but do so at the expense of personal diplomacy and low-level crisis engagement. This distinction stem...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011