Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component

th century, Hans Delbrück described war in terms of annihilation and exhaustion.1 A century later, after the advent of airplanes, access to space, computers, nuclear weapons, computers, and the information revolution, strategists introduced a new paradigm, effects-based operations. This concept suggests a new national objective: control of an enemy. Control is a contemporary, efficient, and humane goal. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional and perhaps dogmatic military objectives of annihilating an enemy’s army or engaging in costly wars of attrition.2 Given the current constrained fiscal environment and limited goals as features of the most likely future conflict scenarios, this article provides a simple conceptual lens through which to plan or analyze coercive operations. Keeping the objective of control in mind, it asserts that the military instrument, and particularly joint aerospace power, is a vital tool for coercing enemy decisionmakers. Then it proposes a simple model that leaders and strategists might consider when planning coercive campaigns. This treatment is not a debate over decisiveness or Service roles and missions. If one accepts Carl von Clausewitz’s idea that war is politics, then political realities must bound the use of force. So, assuming that the United States will be forced into conflicts in coming years, the most likely disputes will be characterized by limited means and ends. Today, the air component—joint and coalition aerospace power—often provides lower-cost and lower-risk coercive action. Difficult strategic situations require decisionmakers to use limited means to change an adversary’s behavior. It is not hyperbole to state that the use of limited military force is deep-seated in contemporary American culture. Embedded reporters in Iraq and the administration’s measured response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks provide compelling evidence. The United States did not rush headlong into battle. Military and civilian leaders alike attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The targets were the enemy government’s pillars of power, not the populace. Wholesale destruction of civil infrastructure and wanton killing of innocent civilians were avoided through careful planning, adaptive training, and precise execution. U.S.-led coalitions thus toppled two hostile rogue regimes in 2 years; then, in a uniquely American way of leading war, vast amounts of humanitarian support were provided to the people while military operations were engaged against terrorists, enemy combatants, and rogue regime leaders, often simultaneously. Integrated Coercive Strategies and the Role of the Air Component