Adding the Time Dimension to Majority Voting Strategies∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Real-time applications typically have to satisfy high dependability requirements and require fault tolerance in both value and time domains. A widely used approach to ensure fault tolerance in dependable systems is the N-modular redundancy (NMR) which typically uses a majority voting mechanism. However, NMR primarily focuses on producing the correct value, without taking into account the time dimension. In this paper, we propose a new approach, Voting on Time and Value (VTV), applicable to real-time systems, which extends the modular redundancy approach by explicitly considering both value and timing failures, such that correct value is produced at correct time, under specified assumptions. We illustrate the proposed approach by an algorithm applicable for triple modular redundancy (TMR).
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تاریخ انتشار 2008