Mechanising BAN Kerberos by the Inductive Method
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Mechanising BAN Kerberos by the Inductive Method
The version of Kerberos presented by Burrows et al. [5] is fully mechanised using the Inductive Method. Two models are presented, allowing respectively the leak of any session keys, and of expired session keys. Thanks to timestamping, the protocol provides the involved parties with strong guarantees in a realistically hostile environment. These guarantees are supported by the generic theorem pr...
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The Yahalom protocol is one of those analyzed by Burrows et al. [5]. Based upon their analysis, they have proposed modifications to make the protocol easier to understand and to analyze. Both versions of Yahalom have now been analyzed using Isabelle/HOL. Modified Yahalom satisfies strong security goals, and the original version is adequate. The mathematical reasoning behind these machine proofs...
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