Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction

نویسندگان

  • Jacob Glazer
  • Motty Perry
چکیده

We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism introduced by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). We show that almost any social choice function can be virtually implemented via a finite sequential game of perfect information. The solution concept assumed is backwards induction. In particular, any social choice function that is virtually implementable via the Abreu–Matsushima mechanism is also virtually implementable by a sequential mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

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تاریخ انتشار 1993