Top Trading Cycles under General Capacities: A Characterization
نویسنده
چکیده
We characterize the top trading cycles mechanism for priority-based allocation of indivisible objects when objects have general capacities. We say that a mechanism is top-priority trading-proof if the top ranked agent at any object can never benefit from obtaining (or trading for) a top priority of any agent assigned a copy of this object. This axiom captures a new way that top priorities are respected. We show that an allocation mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, recursivity, respecting top priorities and top-priority trading-proofness if and only if it is the top trading cycles mechanism.
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