The Shapley-Shubik Index in the Presence of Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015).
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