Nominal Bargaining Power, Selection Protocol and Discounting in Legislative Bargaining∗

The effects of changes in nominal bargaining power, the proposal selection rule and discounting in legislative bargaining outcomes are investigated. The comparative static predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model better organize behavior than does Gamson’s Law (1961). However, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under Baron-Ferejohn as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game in favor of a behavioral focal point. Regression results similar to those employed in Þeld data provide some support for Gamson’s Law. This is largely accounted for here (and we suspect in Þeld data as well) by the selection protocol, which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Discounting pushes behavior in the right direction but has a much smaller effect than predicted. ∗Kagel and Morelli gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation. We received valuable comments from Eyal Winter.