Innovation incentives or corrupt conflicts of interest? Moving beyond Jekyll and Hyde in regulating biomedical academic-industry relationships.

The most contentious, unresolved issue in biomedicine in the last twenty-five years has been how to best address compensated partnerships between academic researchers and the pharmaceutical industry. Law and policy deliberately promote these partnerships through intellectual property law, research funding programs, and drug and device approval pathways while simultaneously condemning them through conflict-of-interest (COI) regulations. These regulations have not been subjected to the close scrutiny that is typically utilized in administrative law to evaluate and improve regulatory systems. This Article suggests that the solution to this standoff in biomedical law and policy lies in an informed, empirical approach. Such an approach must both recognize such partnerships' legal and practical variations, as well as classify them based on their benefit to innovation and their harm to research biases. Ultimately, this approach must facilitate administrative reforms that would convert what is now an inherently arbitrary, yet widespread, regulatory regime into an epistemically rich mechanism for distinguishing between harmful and beneficial partnerships.