You Can Say That Again

t has been two decades since the publication of Davidson’s twin papers, I “Truth and Meaning” (1967) and “On Saying That” (1968). The first proposed that a Tarskian truth theory for a language L can be (the heart of) a theory of meaning for L. The second proposed a radically novel approach, the paratactic account, to the logical form of indirect discourse. The two proposals are related in a number of ways. The paratactic account claims to show how to construct a truth theory for languages containing indirect discourse and propositional attitude reports. The truth theoretic account of meaning provides motivation and support for the paratactic account. And, somewhat surprisingly, the paratactic account provides a way to get around an objection that many have seen as fatal to Davidson’s truth theoretic account of meaning. Indeed, the proposals are so interconnected, that if one fails, it is likely that the other cannot be successfully defended. Our primary aim in this paper is to motivate the paratactic account and defend it from certain widely known criticisms. Along the way, we will spell out various connections between the paratactic account and the truth theoretic. account of meaning, and explain how the former can be used to support the latter.