Price Differentiation All-Pay Auction-Based Incentives in BitTorrent
نویسندگان
چکیده
Free riding, the behavior of attempting to benefit resources contributed by others while sharing their own values as minimum as possible, is one of the key problems in many P2P systems. Incentive mechanisms are proposed to solve the problem. In this paper, we introduce an all-pay auction model to study the resource distribution process in BitTorrent-like P2P system. Based on this model, the advantages and disadvantages of original BitTorrent incentives are presented. To improve the BitTorrent system-wide performance, we propose a price differentiation all-pay auction based incentive mechanism considering the long-term share ratio and the short-term predicted upload bandwidth comprehensively. Our simulation results verify the effectiveness of the new incentive mechanism to prevent free-riders and strategic peers.
منابع مشابه
BitStore: An Incentive-Compatible Solution for Blocked Downloads in BitTorrent
As many as 30% of all files shared on public BitTorrent networks suffer from the lack of “seeders” (peers that have complete copies of the file being shared); peers attempting to download such a file (“leechers”) may have to wait indefinitely to obtain certain file chunks that are not distributed in the file’s network of peers (the “swarm”). We call this the Blocked Leecher Problem (BLP). To al...
متن کاملLoss Aversion and Sunk Cost Sensitivity in All-pay Auctions for Charity: Experimental Evidence∗
All-pay auctions have demonstrated an extraordinary ability at raising money for charity. One mechanism in particular is the war of attrition, which frequently generates revenue well beyond what is theoretically predicted with rational bidders. However, what motivates the behavioral response in bidders remains unclear. By imposing charity auction incentives in the laboratory, this paper uses co...
متن کاملOptimal auctions with endogenous budgets
We study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets. Before bidding, a bidder decides how much money she will borrow. Bidders incur a cost to borrowing. We show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first-price, second-price and all-pay auction. The all-pay auction gives higher revenue than the first-price auction,...
متن کاملThe All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity...
متن کاملThe All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent ExternalitiesI
We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general, however, the presence of identity...
متن کامل