Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability

Epistemic theories of truth identify truth with some positive epistemic status of truth-bearers. Sophisticated versions of this theory identify truth with some kind of idealization of warranted assertability. 1 The proposal is that a belief, sentence, proposition, etc. is true iff it is warrantedly assertable in ideal epistemic conditions a, b, c…, where a, b, c… signify some sort of projection of current standards of rational acceptability. For example, it has been proposed that a statement is true iff it is warrantedly assertable 'at the end of inquiry' the superassertability theory of truth, a statement is true iff it is superassertable in the sense that it possesses indefeasible warrant, i.e., warrant that cannot be defeated by any possible change to the 1 Unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth identify truth with bare warranted assertability (read indexed warranted assertability). Proponents of unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth are few and far between. Two examples are James (1975), p. 97 and Rorty (1980). 2 It is important to bear in mind Wright's commitment or lack thereof to the superassertability theory of truth. While Wright inspired the superassertability theory of truth, he is not in fact a proponent of it. The superassertability theory of truth, like other epistemic formulations, is a reductive monistic theory of truth according to which truth is identified with a unique epistemic property, namely, the property of superassertability (the explanation of which follows in the text). Wright, on the other hand, is the proponent of a pluralistic theory of truth according to which truth is not identified with any unique property (epistemic or non-epistemic), but instead is constituted differently from one discourse to another. For Wright, the import of the superassertability criterion is that it furnishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth-aptitude of discourses, in that a particular discourse whose statements have superassertable truth conditions qualifies as truth-apt (see his 1992, pp. 33, 37, and 38). Assuming a discourse is truth-apt in this minimalist sense, the question remains whether the truth-predicate operative over such a discourse satisfies realist (evidentially unconstrained) criteria. Strictly speaking, then, our evaluation of the so-called 'superassertability theory of truth' pronounces not upon the theory of truth endorsed by Wright or any of his followers, but rather a sophisticated monistically reductive epistemic theory of truth inspired by Wright (a theory considered by many to be the most promising epistemic theory of truth currently up for grabs).