Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]
نویسندگان
چکیده
Then, f ðR ijk;Ri;Rj;RkÞ is either faj; alg; faj; akg or faj; ak; alg: (Only the first two possibilities are mentioned on page 390). In Case A, also consider the possibility that f ðR ijk;Ri;Rj ;RkÞ 1⁄4 faj; ak; alg: Choose RkADE such that falgPkfaj; algPkfajgPkfak; al ; algPkX for any other set X : The proof that k will manipulate at ðR ijk;Ri; % Rj ;RkÞ via Rk is virtually the same as before. Case B remains as in the paper. ARTICLE IN PRESS
منابع مشابه
Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-conca...
متن کاملStrategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives as a function of agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allo...
متن کاملCorrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106]
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights re...
متن کاملContraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence
Contraction Consistent Stochastic Choice Correspondence We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with (possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, ‘contraction consistency’, subsumes earlier notions such as Chernoff’s Condition, ...
متن کاملGeneralized monotonicity and strategy−proofness for non−resolute social choice correspondences
Recently there are several works which analyzed the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules such as Duggan and Schwartz (2000) and Ching and Zhou (2001). In these analyses it was assumed that individual preferences are linear, that is, they excluded indifference from individual preferences. We present an analysis of the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules when ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 120 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005