An Evolutionary Approach to Coalition Formation and Power in Voting Games
نویسنده
چکیده
Evolutionary arguments in non-cooperative game theory are becoming more and more important to justify or refine equilibrium concepts. In cooperative game theory they are rare but growing in number. This paper discusses various approaches, in particular their usefulness and relevance for real world voting games. As the existing approaches turn out to fail to provide any empirically relevant insights for actual voting situations, I will develop an alternative approach in which I give up the assumption of fixed preferences. JEL-Codes: D72, D78, C71, B52
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تاریخ انتشار 2003