Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
نویسنده
چکیده
Article history: Received 24 February 2010 Available online 5 March 2012 JEL classification: C73 D82 L14 J30
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 75 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012