Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games on Networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study behavior and equilibrium selection in experimental network games. We vary two important factors: (a) actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and (b) subjects have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Play conforms strongly to the theoretical predictions, providing an impressive behavioral confirmation of the Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) model. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, even with incomplete information. We find that under complete information, subjects typically play the stochastically-stable (inefficient) equilibrium when the game involves strategic substitutes, but play the efficient one with strategic complements. Our results suggest that equilibrium multiplicity may not be a major concern. Subjects’ actions and realized outcomes under incomplete information depend strongly on both the degree and the connectivity. When there are multiple equilibria, subjects begin by playing the efficient equilibrium, but eventually converge to the inefficient one. JEL Codes: C71, C91, D03, D85
منابع مشابه
Robust Opponent Modeling in Real-Time Strategy Games using Bayesian Networks
Opponent modeling is a key challenge in Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games as the environment is adversarial in these games, and the player cannot predict the future actions of her opponent. Additionally, the environment is partially observable due to the fog of war. In this paper, we propose an opponent model which is robust to the observation noise existing due to the fog of war. In order to cope...
متن کاملNash Equilibrium Strategy for Bi-matrix Games with L-R Fuzzy Payoffs
In this paper, bi-matrix games are investigated based on L-R fuzzy variables. Also, based on the fuzzy max order several models in non-symmetrical L-R fuzzy environment is constructed and the existence condition of Nash equilibrium strategies of the fuzzy bi-matrix games is proposed. At last, based on the Nash equilibrium of crisp parametric bi-matrix games, we obtain the Pareto and weak Pareto...
متن کاملEndogenous networks, social games, and evolution
This paper studies a social game where agents choose their partners as well as their actions. Players interact with direct and indirect neighbors in the endogenous network. We show that the architecture of any nontrivial Nash equilibrium is minimally connected, and equilibrium actions approximate a symmetric equilibrium of the underlying game. We apply the model to analyze stochastic stability ...
متن کاملNeural Networks as a Learning Paradigm for General Normal Form Games1
GAMES1 LEONIDAS SPILIOPOULOS2,3 Abstract This paper addresses how neural networks learn to play one-shot normal form games through experience in an environment of randomly generated game payoffs and randomly selected opponents. This agent based computational approach allows the modeling of learning all strategic types of normal form games, irregardless of the number of pure and mixed strategy N...
متن کاملExperimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection
In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have...
متن کامل