Wittgenstein on Believing
نویسنده
چکیده
The outlines of Wittgenstein’s conception of propositions can be sketched by means of the following four or five points. First, in 1913 Wittgenstein focuses on whatever it is that judgments have in common that allows them to depict a sense and express a thought. In so doing Wittgenstein is pressing to find a sense or proposition – what is believed in -of concern to logic and independent of psychological conditions like judging, asserting, and negating. In his 1913 "Notes on Logic" Wittgenstein says (von Wright 1979, 96):
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