Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview

نویسندگان

  • Bo An
  • Milind Tambe
  • Arunesh Sinha
چکیده

Security is a critical concern around the world, whether it is the challenge of protecting ports, airports and other critical infrastructure, interdicting the illegal flow of drugs, weapons and money, protecting endangered species, forests and fisheries, suppressing urban crime or security in cyberspace. Unfortunately, limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times; instead, we must optimize the use of limited security resources. To that end, we founded the “security games” framework to build decision-aids for security agencies. Security games is a novel area of research that is based on computational and behavioral game theory, while also incorporating elements of AI planning under uncertainty and machine learning. We have deployed securitygames based decision aids for infrastructure security such as at the ports and ferry traffic with the US coast guard (in the ports of New York, Boston, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Houston and others), for security of airports and air traffic with the US Federal Air Marshals and the Los Angeles World Airport (LAX) police, and tested this framework for security of metro trains with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Moreover, recent work on “green security games” has led to testing our decision aids for protection of fisheries with the US Coast Guard and protection of wildlife at sites in multiple countries, and opportunistic crime security games have focused on suppressing urban crime. This chapter will discuss applications of security games, and outline research challenges in security games including algorithms for scaling up security games as well as for handling significant adversarial uncertainty and learning models of human adversary behaviors.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Novel formulations for general and security Stackelberg games

In this paper we analyze general Stackelberg games (SGs) and Stackelberg security games (SSGs). SGs are hierarchical adversarial games where players select actions or strategies to optimize their payoffs in a sequential manner. SSGs are a type of SGs that arise in security applications, where the strategies of the player that acts first consist in protecting subsets of targets and the strategie...

متن کامل

Handling Payoff Uncertainty in Green Security Domains with Adversary Bounded Rationality

Research on Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) has recently shifted to green security domains, for example, protecting wildlife from illegal poaching. Previous research on this topic has advocated the use of behavioral (bounded rationality) models of adversaries in SSG. As its first contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of these behavioral models based on real-world da...

متن کامل

Handling Payoff Uncertainty with Adversary Bounded Rationality in Green Security Domains

Research on Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) has recently shifted to green security domains, for example, protecting wildlife from illegal poaching. Previous research on this topic has advocated the use of behavioral (bounded rationality) models of adversaries in SSG. As its first contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of these behavioral models based on real-world da...

متن کامل

Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games

Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) model scenarios where a defender implements a randomized security policy, while an attacker observes the policy and selects an optimal attack strategy. Applications of SSG include critical infrastructure protection and dynamic defense of computer networks. Current work focuses on centralized algorithms for computing stochastic, mixed-strategy equilibria and tra...

متن کامل

Robust Strategy against Unknown Risk-averse Attackers in Security Games

Stackelberg security games (SSGs) are now established as a powerful tool in security domains. In this paper, we consider a new dimension of security games: the risk preferences of the attacker. Previous work assumes a risk-neutral attacker that maximizes his expected reward. However, extensive studies show that the attackers in some domains are in fact risk-averse, e.g., terrorist groups in cou...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015