Unjust War

I The Traditional Theory of the Just War The traditional theory of the just war comprises two sets of principles, one governing the resort to war (jus ad bellum) and the other governing the conduct of war (jus in bello). One of the central pillars of the traditional theory is that the two set of principles are, in Michael Walzer's words, " logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. " 1 Let us say that those who fight in a just war are just combatants, while those who fight in a war that is unjust because it lacks a just cause (that is, an aim capable of justifying the resort to war) are unjust combatants. 2 Walzer's claim that an unjust war can be fought in accordance with the rules of jus in bello presupposes that those rules do not discriminate between just and unjust combatants but apply equally to both. So his claim echoes that of Henry Sidgwick, who urged that " in formulating the rules which civilised opinion should attempt to impose on combatants, we must abstract from all consideration of the justice of the war. " 3 If, however, the rules of jus in bello abstract from the justice of the war, it seems that we must grant that unjust combatants do not do wrong merely by participating in an unjust war. For it would make little sense to claim that all belligerent acts by unjust combatants are wrong, because the war to which they contribute is unjust, but to commend the unjust combatants for doing these wrong acts in the right way, in accordance with the rules. It is possible, as I will explain later in section IV, for there to be rules that constrain wrongful action. But this is not how the rules of jus in bello are traditionally conceived, even in their application to unjust combatants. While obedience to these rules may not always be sufficient for action in war to be permissible, there is a presumption that, in merely participating in war, even unjust combatants do not act wrongly unless they violate the rules of jus in bello. So the moral position of unjust combatants is, according to the traditional theory, indistinguishable from that of just combatants – a condition that Walzer …