On coalitional semivalues
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games (Owen, 1977), and we define and study coalitional semivalues, which are generalizations of semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 1981).
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 49 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004