Introducing Perfect Forward Secrecy for AN.ON
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we discuss AN.ON’s need to provide perfect forward secrecy and show by an estimation of the channel build up time that the straight forward solution is not a practical solution. In the remaining paper we propose an improvement which enables AN.ON to provide perfect forward secrecy with respect to their current attacker model. Finally, we show that the delay, caused by our improvement, does not decrease the performance significantly.
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