Wealth Inequality and the Price of Anarchy
نویسندگان
چکیده
Price of anarchy quantifies the degradation of social welfare in games due to the lack of a centralized authority that can enforce the optimal outcome. At its antipodes, mechanism design studies how to ameliorate these effects by incentivizing socially desirable behavior (e.g., via tolls or taxes) and implementing the optimal state as equilibrium. In practice, the responsiveness to such measures is not uniform across the population but instead depends on the wealth of each individual. This leads to a natural, but largely unexplored, question. Does optimal mechanism design entrench, or maybe even exacerbate, social inequality? We study this question in nonatomic congestion games, arguably one of the most thoroughly studied settings from the perspectives of price of anarchy as well as mechanism design. We introduce a new model that incorporates the wealth distribution of the population and captures the income elasticity of travel time (i.e., how does loss of time translate to lost income). This allows us to argue about the equality of wealth distribution both before and after employing a mechanism. We start our analysis by establishing a broad qualitative result, showing that tolls always increase inequality in symmetric congestion games under any reasonable metric of inequality, e.g., the Gini index. Next, we introduce the iniquity index, a novel measure for quantifying the magnitude of these forces towards a more unbalanced wealth distribution and show it has good normative properties (robustness to scaling of income, no-regret learning). We analyze iniquity both in theoretical settings (Pigou’s network under various wealth distributions) as well as experimental ones (based on a large scale field experiment in Singapore). Finally, we provide an algorithm for computing optimal tolls for any point of the trade-off of relative importance of efficiency and equality. We conclude with a discussion of our findings in the context of theories of justice as developed in contemporary social sciences and present several directions for future research.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1802.09269 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2018