Do Executives' Backgrounds Matter to IPO Investors? Evidence from the Life Science Industry

نویسندگان

  • Jay Chok
  • Jifeng Qian
چکیده

In this study, we focus on the impact of senior executives' industry backgrounds on the amount of capital raised in the stock market. The primary contribution of the study entails applying the upper echelon theory to the initial public offering (IPO) phenomenon. Specifically, we hypothesize that the industry backgrounds of corporate executives affect the amount of capital that the firm raised in the primary stock market. We argue that the firm's future investment strategies are unobserved by the investors ex-ante and investors expect firms' investment strategies to be based on the executives' industry backgrounds. As a result, the executives' industry backgrounds influence the investors' expectations about what investment strategies the firm is likely to deploy. Furthermore, the above logic also suggests that executives of different industry backgrounds should prefer different investment strategies corresponding with demand for different amount of capital. As a result, we expect the industry backgrounds to covary with the capital raised from both the supply and demand perspectives. To test the hypotheses, we ran a reduced econometric model wherein the executives' background predicts the amount of capital raised. Regression analyses suggest that the capital raised is negatively associated with the number of senior executives with prior career experience in the healthcare and genomic sectors but positively associated with the number of senior executives with prior career experience in regulatory affairs. The results provide tentative support for the notion that investors infer corporate strategies from senior executives' industry backgrounds.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Do Venture Capitalists Certify New Issues in the IPO Market?

In addition to corporate executives, venture capitalists (VCs) have been receiving hot IPO shares from investment banks. The cozy relationship between VCs and investment banks calls in question of the well-documented certification role of VCs in IPO market. Using IPO data from 1988 through 1999, we document strong empirical evidence against the certification role of VCs. Instead, we find that V...

متن کامل

Working Paper INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND PRE-IPO SHAREHOLDERS: ANGELS VERSUS VENTURE CAPITALISTS

At the time of an initial public offering, shares in a firm are typically held by venture capitalists, insiders, corporate investors, and angel investors. We examine the role of angel investors in the IPO process. We find that angel investors provide equity capital in industries that venture capitalists are less likely to serve and that shareholders in angel backed IPO firms are more likely to ...

متن کامل

Anchor Investors in IPOs

Anchor Investors in IPOs In July 2009, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) permitted a version of bookbuilding in which IPO managers solicit bids from and allocate allocations to anchor investors in the IPO pre-market, subject to disclosure of the price, quantity, and identity of anchors participating in the pre-market bookbuilding. We obtain share allocation data in anchor IPOs. ...

متن کامل

Ownership Concentration and Initial Public Offering Performance: Evidence from Thailand

This study examines the relation between ownership concentration and performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Thailand during 1989-1993. Ownership concentration plays a crucial role in emerging capital markets such as Thailand and can significantly affect IPO performance. Several testable hypotheses are constructed from the IPO literature to examine short-term and long-term IPO perform...

متن کامل

The effects of demand, competitive, and technological uncertainty on board monitoring and institutional ownership of IPO firms

This paper considers industry-specific contingencies that may account for some of the inter-firm heterogeneity in the deployment of specific corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. We examine how differences in demand, competitive, and technological uncertainty in the industry influence the levels of IPO firm monitoring by board outsiders and institutional investors. We test our theory us...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره 8  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013