Experimentation with Congestion

We consider a model in which two players choose between learning about the quality of a risky option (modelled as a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate), and competing for the use of a single shared safe option that can only be used by one agent at a time. Firstly, when players cannot reverse their decision to switch to the safe option, the socially optimal policy makes them experiment for longer than they would if they played alone. The equilibrium in the two-player game is in this case always inefficient and involves too little experimentation. As the competition intensifies, the inefficiency increases until the players behave myopically and entirely disregard the option-value associated with experimenting on the risky option. Secondly, when the decision to switch to the safe option is revocable, the player whose risky option is most likely to pay off will interrupt his own experimenting and, with view to easing the opponent’s pressure on the common option, force him to experiment more intensely. Even if this does not succeed, the first player will eventually resume his own experimenting and leave the common option for the opponent to take. This result is striking and at odds with intuitions from standard bandit models. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83, J41