Israel Facing Terrorism

Throughout its existence as a state, Israel has had to cope with intense terrorism in three arenas: within its territory, across the borders, and abroad. This problem has been a major political and psychological factor in Israel’s reality and the need to cope with it has forced the public and governments to deal with hard dilemmas. This article examines Israel’s conduct in the struggle against terrorism with regard to the choice between maintaining human rights on the one hand and insuring public safety on the other hand. Following a review of the nature of the basic problem that a democracy faces when it has to deal with political terrorism, the paper describes the physical and psychological characteristics of the threat that Israel has had to confront. The paper then turns to examine Israel’s response, focusing on two controversial issues: collective punishment, as exercised in the demolition of houses and restrictions imposed on the adversary population’s freedom of movement, and extra-judicial killing of terrorists. These measures are weighed in terms of their acceptability in a democratic country and their effectiveness as anti-terrorism policies. TERRORISM – CRIME OR WAR? Coping with terrorism in a democracy entails difficult problems. These problems stem from the fact that, in several respects, terrorism falls somewhere between crime and war. The democratic law enforcement system is well adapted to deal fairly effectively with common crime while retaining and safeguarding the principles of civil liberties; it is also well adjusted to cope with a general war against a foreign state. It is, however, ill equipped to deal with a situation of large scale politically motivated violence by sub-state groups. On the one hand, the legal system is not designed to cope effectively with large organizations that are well armed, financed, trained, and determined, whose members are willing to sacrifice themselves for their cause, that enjoy broad popular support within segments of the country’s population and, sometimes, financial, logistical and political support from other states. On the other hand, neither internal insurgency nor international terrorism is customarily regarded as a state of war. Politically and legally, the means and methods that a state can use in a war situation cannot be readily employed for coping with the limited violence generated by domestic or foreign terrorist groups or by clandestine actions of foreign states. The insufficiency of the normal Israel Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, January 2005, pp.223–237 ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online DOI: 10.1080/1353712042000324535 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd Ariel Merari is professor at the Department of Psychology at Tel Aviv University and the director of the Political Violence Research Unit. legal measures in coping with terrorism has resulted in the institution of special measures in all democratic countries that have faced a surge of terrorism. As Zagari noted in a report to the European Parliament, ‘All the countries which in one way or another have suffered from terrorism, from the Federal Republic of Germany to Italy, from France to Spain, from Ireland to the United Kingdom and Canada, have introduced special provisions in criminal law, criminal proceeding and the judicial system, as well as police measures, in order to adapt the legislation in force to the specific features of terrorism’s objectives and methods of combat’. Conceptually, political terrorism also differs from common crime in that it is a declared war on the state, the regime, or on a certain social group, and the terrorists view themselves as combatants rather than as criminals, a view that the state rejects. This situation creates a theoretical and practical paradox. If we are to adopt the terrorists’ claim for combatants’ status, then security forces should be allowed to shoot them on sight; if caught, they should be detained for the duration of the armed conflict rather than be put on trial. The lack of clarity and established norms concerning the status of terrorist groups leaves a legal and political vacuum. In practice, in coping with domestic terrorism, democratic states have adopted pragmatic compromise solutions that, resting on emergency regulations, have, in fact, treated terrorism as a hybrid of crime and war. In determining the spot where a state places itself along the spectrum between viewing terrorism as crime or as a war, an important consideration relates to the question whether the terrorist operations originate within or outside the jurisdiction of the state (‘domestic’ v. international terrorism). In cases where the terrorists are based outside the targeted state’s borders and cannot be stopped either because they control the territory where they are located or because they enjoy the protection of a host country, the situation resembles a state of war in all practical respects. This was the case, for example, of Israel’s struggle against Palestinian groups in Jordan (in the 1950s and 1960s) and in Lebanon (1970s and 1980s), against Hezbollah in Lebanon (since the 1980s), and of the recent United States confrontation with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Yet ambiguity exists even with regard to coping with the relatively simple case of international terrorism. Consider, for example, the status of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners captured by the United States in Afghanistan. These prisoners are held by the US in Guantanamo Base, an American enclave in Cuba. They do not have the rights of common criminal suspects or convicts. They are detained without trial or court order and have no access to a lawyer. On the other hand, they do not have the benefits of prisoners of war, such as the right of visit by the Red Cross, receiving mail from their families, and being released and repatriated at the end of hostilities. By and large, international law and custom leave international terrorism in an abyss. ISRAEL AFFAIRS 224