A general theory of cross - cultural variation in cognitive style

The purpose of this paper is to put forth a theory that will synthesize as much as possible of what has been observed about cross-cultural differences in thinking in the last few decades. The theoretical notion that is used is cognitive style, defined as learned habits to emphasize the development and use of certain universal cognitive processes. Three cognitive style variables will be used to bring together a large and diverse literature. They are: differentiation-integration, contextualization-decontextualization, and reality-hypotheticality. Although the concept of cognitive style comes from psychology, the approach taken here belongs to cognitive science since extensive use will be made of studies from other disciplines, especially anthropology and linguistics. While I will show that many different findings can be joined together by considering cognitive style, there are some well-known topics in cross-cultural cognition which lie outside our scope. One example would be the Whorfian hypothesis that language influences thinking (Lucy 1992), and another the study of differences among modern nations in school achievement (Stigler & Perry 1990). However, the significance of Western schooling as a cultural institution falls within the theory (Lave 1990). The first two cognitive style variables have been developed recently from an older variable put forward by Witkin, field-dependence-independence (Witkin et al. 1962), whereas the third one has arisen separately. Witkin regarded the two cognitive styles which have been taken from his variable as “aspects” of field-dependence-independence, but as we will see, recent research shows that they have to be treated as separate variables. Since the study of cognitive style begins in psychology, I will use psychological tasks to introduce the variables and then spread from there to anthropology and linguistics. As I introduce the variables I will sometimes also introduce the cultures across which they vary. To do so I use traditional classifications of cultures from anthropology as a starting point. However, as study of a particular culture proceeds the traditional classes become uninformative and the particular culture history of that group’s adaptation must be used instead. For example, the Iroquoians of the Lower Great Lakes in North America are traditionally classed as swidden agriculturalists, but their culture history reveals that they only adopted this system about AD 900, and some details of their cognitive emphases are only explainable if this relatively recent change from a hunting society is recognized. For instance, Chafe (1964) reports that in one Iroquoian language, Seneca, words for pre-agricultural shamanistic practices appear to be old because many are unanalysable, whereas words for agricultural ceremonies appear new because all of them are analysable into component morphemes. In the end only the actual history of a particular human group is real, and the classes of cultures are just convenient approximations. Similarly, the cognitive styles are seen as part of the culture history of each group which are learned through everyday cognition as well as whatever forms of schooling that were used. They are observable, as we will see, both through natural observation of daily use and through some psychological tests and tasks which have been shown to correlate with real-life thinking.