A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

نویسنده

  • Belén Jerez
چکیده

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived. JEL Classification Numbers. D82, D61, C61.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 112  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003