Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games
نویسنده
چکیده
It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 102 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002