The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation
نویسندگان
چکیده
This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen shareholders—investors who enter the securities market primarily through employersponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group
منابع مشابه
Investor Protection , Diversification , Investment , and Tobin ’ s q ∗
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