Out.f-Body Experiences in the Blind

The theoretical significance of out-of-body experiences in blind people is explored. In this context I report results of a survey of a small sample of blind adults. It is concluded that we have yet to locate a case of an out-ofbody experience in the blind that has critical implications for the interpretation of the experience among the general population. Instances of the out-of-body experience (OBE) among blind persons have been of interest to researchers from several perspectives. The bases of such interest first will be nominated, and after the presentation of some case material, a more critical examination will be offered. The occurrence of OBEs in blind people could be deemed to bear upon the hypothesis tha t the OBE is a product of the imagination, or to be more precise, tha t the OBE essentially is an instance of visual imagery. Broadly speaking, there are two types of theoretical interpretation of the OBE (see Irwin, 1985, Ch. 6 for a more exhaustive review). The ecsomatic hypothesis proposes the OBE to be literally what it seems to be, a transitory separation of mind or soul from the physical body. Alternately under the imaginal hypothesis the experience is interpreted in terms of the processes of mental imagery. Various forms of the imaginal hypothesis have been expounded but most, either implicitly or explicitly, emphasize the role of specifically visual imagery in the OBE. My interest in OBEs of the blind was aroused initially in relation to the latter approach to the experience. The rationale here is as follows. Acknowledgement hereby is given to the efforts of Margaret Kerr, Coordinator of Field Services for the Royal Blind Society of New South Wales, Australia, in supervising the collection of data reported in this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Irwin at the Department of Psychology, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia. Journal of Near-Death Studies, 6(1) Fall 1987 9 1987 Human Sciences Press 53 54 JOURNAL OF NEAR-DEATH STUDIES While partially sighted people certainly may have visual imagery (by way of pictorial dreams, for example), adults who have been totally blind since birth, or from the age of five years or less, do not experience visual imagery (Berger, Olley, & Oswald, 1962; Jastrow, 1888, cited in Ramsey, 1953, p. 434; Kimmins, 1931). The occurrence of an OBE in a completely sightless individual therefore might be held to contradict the imaginal hypothesis and perhaps even to support the ecsomatic approach. Out-of-body experiences in the blind might be pert inent also to the issue of the contribution of sensory deprivation (or marked sensory restriction) to the occurrence of the experience. Conditions of acute sensory restriction have been found to facilitate OBEs (e.g., Heron, 1957; Palmer & Lieberman, 1975; Reed & Sedman, 1964), and indeed V. Krishnan (1980, 1981) has suggested the OBE may be purely a defensive response to circumstances of sensory deprivation. To the extent that blindness either intrinsically entails sensory restriction or increases the likelihood of sensory deprivation, the incidence of OBEs among the blind and the partially sighted should be relatively high. A survey of the OBE within this population therefore might permit an assessment of that hypothesis. Upon the assumption or the confirmation of the ecsomatic hypothesis, OBEs in the blind also may illuminate the characteristics of the exteriorized self or so-called "astral body." Herbert Greenhouse (1975, p. 313), for example, asked if the astral body shares "the defects of the physical body." He maintained the occurrence of an OBE in a congenitally sightless person would offer a definitive context in which to test that issue. More recently Krishnan (1984) has proposed the perceptual content of the OBE may have a "physical basis," that is, it may rely upon certain sensory mechanisms of the central nervous system. As a test of that proposition Krishnan (1983) hypothesized that the OBE of a congenitally blind person should be distinct from the experience in sighted people. Specifically, because people who surgically regain their sight take some time to learn visual identification of objects, the initial OBEs of the congenitally blind should exhibit the same property if the experience depends upon the operation of the visual pathways of the nervous system. The content of a congenitally blind subject's OBE therefore may speak to Krishnan's notion of the physical basis of out-of-body visual impressions. The occurrence and the nature of OBEs in the blind therefore are potentially significant from several diverse perspectives. In that light