Lecture Note 2: Relational Contracts
نویسنده
چکیده
Game theory is rampant in economics. Having long ago invaded industrial organization (the sub-field of economics that studies firms and their product markets), game-theoretic modeling is now commonplace in international, labor, macro, and financial economics, and is gathering steam even in development economics and economic history. Nor is economics alone: accounting, law, marketing, political science, and even sociology are beginning similar experiences.
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