The Cross Entropy Method for the N-Persons Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
نویسنده
چکیده
We apply the Cross-entropy method to the N persons Iterated Prisoners Dilemma and show that cooperation is more readily achieved than with existing methods such as genetic algorithms or reinforcement learning.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008