Selfish routing equilibrium in stochastic traffic network: A probability-dominant description
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper suggests a probability-dominant user equilibrium (PdUE) model to describe the selfish routing equilibrium in a stochastic traffic network. At PdUE, travel demands are only assigned to the most dominant routes in the same origin-destination pair. A probability-dominant rerouting dynamic model is proposed to explain the behavioral mechanism of PdUE. To facilitate applications, the logit formula of PdUE is developed, of which a well-designed route set is not indispensable and the equivalent varitional inequality formation is simple. Two routing strategies, i.e., the probability-dominant strategy (PDS) and the dominant probability strategy (DPS), are discussed through a hypothetical experiment. It is found that, whether out of insurance or striving for perfection, PDS is a better choice than DPS. For more general cases, the conducted numerical tests lead to the same conclusion. These imply that PdUE (rather than the conventional stochastic user equilibrium) is a desirable selfish routing equilibrium for a stochastic network, given that the probability distributions of travel time are available to travelers.
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