Working Papers Quantity Discounts from Risk Averse Sellers
نویسنده
چکیده
FTC Bureau of Economics working papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analyses and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Bureau of Economics, other Commission staff, or the Commission itself. Upon request, single copies of the paper will be provided. References in publications to FTC Bureau of Economics working papers by FTC economists (other than acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such unpublished materials) should be cleared with the author to protect the tentative character of these papers. ______________________________________________________________________________
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