Auction Design with Non-Convex Costs: An Experimental Approach
نویسنده
چکیده
We present results from a series of experiments with human subjects at the University of Maryland Subjects participated as suppliers in an auction, each with the capacity to supply up to two units of a good, and bid to supply a portion of the buyer's fixed demand of 3 units. We study the performance of 3 different auction formats: (1) uniform-price one-part bid, (2) uniform-price two-part bid, (3) discriminatory-price two-part bid.
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