Content externalism and phenomenal character: a new worry about privileged access

A central question in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind is whether the thesis of content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. According to this doctrine, an individual knows the contents of her thoughts independently of empirical observation. It is argued that if the contents of a subject’s thoughts are in part individuated by environmental factors, as the content externalist claims some are, then the subject could not know the contents of these thoughts independently of empirical investigation. A related doctrine, no less natural, holds that an individual knows the phenomenal character of her experience without empirical investigation. It is typically assumed that content externalism does not threaten this latter doctrine: Even if content externalism is true and does imply that a subject cannot know without empirical investigation the content of some of her thoughts (e.g., her thoughts about water), surely she can know without empirical investigation what it is “like” for her to be having whatever experience she is having. I shall argue that, if content externalism is in tension with privileged access to content—I shall not discuss whether it is—then content externalism (or at least many of the standard arguments for content externalism) are also in tension with privileged access to phenomenal character. Content externalists may thus have a new problem on their hands.