Volker Nocke , and Lucy White “ When and

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property tha...

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?∗

In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers faciliate collusion through the operation of a foreclosure effect: Cheating unintegrated firms can no longer prof...

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games∗

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is...

Competition for Scarce Resources∗

We show that the efficient allocation of production capacity can turn a competitive industry and downstream market into an imperfectly competitive one. Even though downstream firms have symmetric production technologies, the downstream industry structure will be symmetric only if capacity is sufficiently scarce. Otherwise it will be asymmetric, with one large “fat” capacity-hoarding firm and a ...

Market Structure : Theory and Evidence