Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
نویسنده
چکیده
We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (1988, International Journal of Game Theory 17, 8999) and Nowak (1997, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 127141) as well as most of the characterizations by Casajus (2010, Theory and Decision, forthcoming) are redundant. Further, we explore symmetry implications of Lehrers 2-e¢ ciency axiom. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Number: C71.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012