Evolutionary Stability in Multicriteria Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The evolutionary stability is a fundamental issue in single-criterion games. This paper considers the evolutionary stability in multicriteria games. Since a payoff is given by a vector, we provide several concepts which are equivalent in single-criterion games and investigate their hierarchical structure. On the other hand, Shapley has introduced concepts called a strong and a weak equilibrium. We also discuss the relationship between the equilibria and the evolutionary stability.
منابع مشابه
Power allocation rules under fuzzy behavior and multicriteria situations
In this paper, we adopt supreme-utilities among fuzzy level (decision) vectors to propose a power allocation rule, its efficient extension and normalization in the framework of multicriteria fuzzy transferable-utility (TU) games. We also provide several axiomatic results to present the rationality for these rules. Based on different viewpoints, we introduce different formulations and dynamic re...
متن کاملEvolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences
We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. ...
متن کاملMulticriteria games and potentials
In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57–61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.
متن کاملEvolutionary dynamics and stability in discrete and continuous games
We investigate the correspondence between discrete-trait games (for example, matrix games) and continuous-trait games, paying particular attention to the standard criteria for evolutionary stability. We show that the standard evolutionarily stable strategy conditions for discretetrait games can be seen as a special case of the conditions employed in continuous-trait games.
متن کاملUniversity of Seville , July 1 - 3 , 2002 13 4 Approximate solutions and Well - posedness in Multicriteria Games
For long time, real valued functions have played a central role in game theory. More recently, motivated by applications to real-world situations, much attention has been attracted to multicriteria games, i.e. games with vector payoffs. Different concepts of solutions have been introduced and existence of such solutions has been investigated by various authors, mostly in the setting of finite d...
متن کامل