Ethical issues in the disposal of radioactive waste

This paper starts from the premise that radioactive material, generated as a by-product of the British nuclear industry, already exists in significant quantity. The question of what should be done with this material therefore needs to be answered, even if no more of it is created. Whether the industry should continue producing radioactive waste is a legitimate question, and one which raises significant ethical issues. The main focus here, however, is on the question of what should be done with existing waste; a question which must be answered whether or not the industry continues. This paper does not to try to answer this question. Its aim is to show that any attempt to decide what should be done with radioactive waste will raise issues which are essentially ethical or evaluative in nature; and that these ethical and evaluative dimensions cannot be avoided. Introduction and summary This paper starts from the premise that radioactive material, generated as a by-product of the British nuclear industry, already exists in significant quantity. The question of what should be done with this material therefore needs to be answered, even if no more of it is created. Whether the industry should continue producing radioactive waste is a legitimate question, and one which raises significant ethical issues. The main focus here, however, is on the question of what should be done with existing waste; a question which must be answered whether or not the industry continues. This paper does not to try to answer this question. Its aim is to show that any attempt to decide what should be done with radioactive waste will raise issues which are essentially ethical or evaluative in nature; and that these ethical and evaluative dimensions cannot be avoided. I begin the paper (section one) with brief working definitions of the terms, ‘ethics’, ‘values’ and ‘normative’. I then explore the extent to which a contrast can usefully be drawn between issues of ethics and values on the one hand, and empirical issues on the other, in the context of animal husbandry. I use this example partly because it is one I am familiar with; partly, and more importantly, in order to discuss the normative/empirical distinction more generally than just in the context of nuclear waste. In the next two sections (sections three and four) I assume that a distinction between normative and empirical issues can usefully be drawn. I then make an initial attempt at identifying the ethical and evaluative issues raised by the issue of radioactive waste disposal. The existence of these issues is frequently overlooked and ethical and evaluative judgments are thus often made implicitly rather than explicitly. I argue, however, that they cannot be avoided. In the fifth section I suggest that scientific practice is imbued with values and that a sharp or absolute distinction between normative and empirical issues is therefore misleading. Once this is recognized, a further set of ethical and evaluative issues raised by the disposal of radio-active waste can be identified. In the next section I argue that, for a variety of reasons, all the normative judgments discussed and identified above should be made explicit, and opened out for critical discussion and debate. I then discuss two common misconceptions about ethics and values, and suggest that challenging these misconceptions is extremely important. In the eighth section I offer some observations about the political and practical significance of philosophy and I conclude with some suggestions about how a debate about the ethical dimensions of radio-active waste management might be taken forward from here. 1. Working definitions