On the Relevance of Alternatives in Bargaining: Average Alternative Solutions
نویسنده
چکیده
We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative solutions'', characterize them, and show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are limits of average alternative solutions. We also provide alternative characterizations for the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. JEL Classification: C71, C78, D74.
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