On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria

نویسندگان

  • Pavlo Prokopovych
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
چکیده

The focus of this paper is on developing verifiable sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerned. Then, we study equilibrium existence in better-reply secure games possessing a payoff securemixed extension. With the aid of an example, we show that such games need not have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We provide geometric conditions for the mixed extension of a two-person game that is reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payoff secure to be better-reply secure. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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تاریخ انتشار 2016