The Value of Repeated Games with an Informed Controller
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a certain class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 37 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012