Internet Appendix for Bank Skin in the Game and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans
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چکیده
Section C In this section we provide additional discussion and descriptive statistics on our sample of loan packages. Section D In this section we analyze the optimal loan contract if the lenders can commit to renegotiation behavior. Section E In this section we derive the competitive equilibrium contract when the bank share k is endogenous. Section F In this section we present an extension of our model, in which the firm’s free cash flow R is stochastic. Section G In this section we present an extension of our model, in which the control right over enforcement cannot be allocated. Section H In this section we present all remaining proofs.
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Bank Skin in the Game and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans
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