D2.4.9 Reputation Mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
EU-IST Network of Excellence (NoE) IST-2004-507482 KWEB Deliverable D2.4.9 (WP2.4) This report summarizes the state-of-the-art regarding reputation mechanisms and outlines the reputation model that will be implemented as a prototype in D2.4.6.2. A second version of this document, including a detailed specification of the reputation model, is due in December 2005. Keyword list: Reputation Mechanisms, Web Services, Semantic Web Services, Semantic Web Copyright c © 2005 The contributors Document Identifier KWEB/2005/D2.4.9/v1.2 Project KWEB EU-IST-2004-507482 Version v1.2 Date August 3, 2005 State final Distribution public Knowledge Web Consortium This document is part of a research project funded by the IST Programme of the Commission of the European Communities as project number IST-2004-507482. University of Innsbruck (UIBK) Coordinator Institute of Computer Science Technikerstrasse 13 A-6020 Innsbruck Austria Contact person: Dieter Fensel E-mail address: [email protected] École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) Computer Science Department Swiss Federal Institute of Technology IN (Ecublens), CH-1015 Lausanne Switzerland Contact person: Boi Faltings E-mail address: [email protected] France Telecom (FT) 4 Rue du Clos Courtel 35512 Cesson Sévigné France. PO Box 91226 Contact person : Alain Leger E-mail address: [email protected] Freie Universität Berlin (FU Berlin) Takustrasse 9 14195 Berlin Germany Contact person: Robert Tolksdorf E-mail address: [email protected] Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (FUB) Piazza Domenicani 3 39100 Bolzano Italy Contact person: Enrico Franconi E-mail address: [email protected] Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA) ZIRST 655 avenue de l’Europe Montbonnot Saint Martin 38334 Saint-Ismier France Contact person: Jérôme Euzenat E-mail address: [email protected] Centre for Research and Technology Hellas / Informatics and Telematics Institute (ITI-CERTH) 1st km Thermi Panorama road 57001 Thermi-Thessaloniki Greece. Po Box 361 Contact person: Michael G. Strintzis E-mail address: [email protected] Learning Lab Lower Saxony (L3S) Expo Plaza 1 30539 Hannover Germany Contact person: Wolfgang Nejdl E-mail address: [email protected] National University of Ireland Galway (NUIG) National University of Ireland Science and Technology Building University Road Galway Ireland Contact person: Christoph Bussler E-mail address: [email protected] The Open University (OU) Knowledge Media Institute The Open University Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA United Kingdom Contact person: Enrico Motta E-mail address: [email protected] Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) Campus de Montegancedo sn 28660 Boadilla del Monte Spain Contact person: Asunción Gómez Pérez E-mail address: [email protected] University of Karlsruhe (UKARL) Institut für Angewandte Informatik und Formale Beschreibungsverfahren AIFB Universität Karlsruhe D-76128 Karlsruhe Germany Contact person: Rudi Studer E-mail address: [email protected] University of Liverpool (UniLiv) Chadwick Building, Peach Street L697ZF Liverpool United Kingdom Contact person: Michael Wooldridge E-mail address: [email protected] University of Manchester (UoM) Room 2.32. Kilburn Building, Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester, Oxford Road Manchester, M13 9PL United Kingdom Contact person: Carole Goble E-mail address: [email protected] University of Sheffield (USFD) Regent Court, 211 Portobello street S14DP Sheffield United Kingdom Contact person: Hamish Cunningham E-mail address: [email protected] University of Trento (UniTn) Via Sommarive 14 38050 Trento Italy Contact person: Fausto Giunchiglia E-mail address: [email protected] Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA) De Boelelaan 1081a 1081HV. Amsterdam The Netherlands Contact person: Frank van Harmelen E-mail address: [email protected] Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) Pleinlaan 2, Building G1
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