Quantitative Methods Inquires 82 ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR INDICATORS AGGREGATION
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper presents some aspects related to the issues of aggregating economic indicators. Departing from the research of Gh. Paun (1983) we will prove a theorem which states that under certain, natural assumptions, it is impossible to obtain an optimum aggregation. Unlike the original work of Paun, in this paper we are giving a rather simple proof of this theorem.
منابع مشابه
Arrow theorems in the fuzzy setting
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